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Abstract
The theory of computer viruses has been studied by several authors,
though there is no systematic theoretical study up to now. The long
time open question in this area is as follows: Is it possible to design
a signature-free (including dynamic signatures which we will define late)
virus? In this paper, we give an affirmative answer to this question from a
theoretical viewpoint. We will introduce a new stronger concept: dynamic
signatures of viruses, and present a method to design viruses which are
static signature-free and whose dynamic signatures are hard to determine
unless some cryptographic assumption fails. We should remark that our
results are only for theoretical interest and may be resource intensive in
practice.
1 Introduction
The term computer virus is often used to indicate any software that can
cause harm to systems or networks. People often does not include certain
malicious software, such as Trojan horses and network worms, into the
computer virus family. In our discussion, a computer virus refers to any
code that cause computer or network systems to behave in a different
manner than the desired one.
A Trojan horse program is a useful or apparently useful program or a
shell script containing hidden code that performs some unwanted function.
A simple example of a Trojan horse program might be a telnet program.
When a user invokes the program, it appears to be performing telneting
and nothing more, however it may also be quietly changing the file ac-
cess permissions. Some Trojan horse programs are difficult to detect, for
example, a compiler on a multi-user system that has been modified to
insert additional code into certain programs when they are compiled (see
Thompson [14]).
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The hidden code of a Trojan horse program is deliberately placed by
the program’s author. Generally, the hidden code in a computer virus
program is added by another program, that program itself is a computer
virus. Thus one of the typical characteristics of a computer virus is to
copy its hidden code to other programs, thereby infecting them.
Generally, a computer virus exhibits three characteristics (see, e.g.,
[9, 15, 16]): a replication mechanism, an activation mechanism, and an
objective. The replication mechanism performs the following functions:
search for other programs to infect, when finds a program, possibly deter-
mines whether the program has been previously infected, insert the hidden
instructions somewhere in the program, modifies the execution sequence
of the program’s instruction such that the hidden code will be executed
whenever the program is invoked, and set some flags indicating that the
program has been infected. The flag may be necessary because without
it, programs could be repeatedly infected and grow noticeably large.
The activation mechanism checks for the occurrence of some event.
When the event occurs, the computer virus executes its objective, which
is generally some unwanted, harmful action.
Anti-virus tools performs three basic functions: detect, identify, or re-
move viruses. Detection tools perform proactive detection, active detec-
tion, or reactive detection. That is, they detect a virus before it executes,
during execution, or after execution. Identification and removal tools are
more straightforward in their application.
For detection of viruses, there are five classes of techniques (see, e.g.,
[9]): signature scanning and algorithmic detection, general purpose mon-
itors, access control shells, checksums for change detection, and heuristic
binary analysis. Note that after the paper [9], a new technique emulation
detection has been extensively used to detect polymorphic viruses. In this
paper, we will concentrate on designing viruses which are signature-free
and we will not discuss the techniques for identification and removal.
A common class of anti-virus tools employs the complementary tech-
niques of signature scanning and algorithmic detection. This class of tools
are known as scanners. Scanners are limited intrinsically to the detection
of known viruses. In signature scanning an executable is searched for a
selected binary code sequence, called a virus signature.
General purpose monitors protect a system from the replication of
viruses by actively intercepting malicious actions. Access control shells
function as part of the operating system, much like monitoring tools.
Rather than monitoring for virus-like behavior, the shell attempts to en-
force an access control policy for the system. Change detection works
on the theory that executables are static objects; therefore, modification
of an executable implies a possible virus infection. However, this theory
has a basic flaw: some executables are self-modifying. Heuristic binary
analysis is a method whereby the analyzer traces through an executable
looking for suspicious, virus-like behavior. If a program appears to per-
form virus-like actions, a warning is displayed.
Indeed, the signature scanner is the mostly used technique to detect
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viruses. Note that at the beginning of this section we mentioned that at
the end of the replication mechanism, the virus will generally put a flag
in the infected program (this flag can often be included in the signature
of the virus). Otherwise the program may be repeatedly infected, and the
size may increase geometrically. Hence the virus will be detected easily.
The authors of computer viruses always try to design viruses that are
immune from those anti-virus software on market. A polymorphic virus
(see, e.g., [9, 12]) creates copies during replication that are functionally
equivalent but have distinctly different byte streams. To achieve this,
the virus may randomly insert superfluous instructions, interchange the
order of independent instructions, or choose from a number of different
encryption schemes. This variable quality makes the virus difficult to lo-
cate, identify, and remove. This kind of virus can be thought as static
signature-free viruses. However, up to my knowledge, all known poly-
morphic viruses can be detected by algorithmic detection (or emulation
detection) due to their dynamic signatures.
In this paper, we will introduce a new concept: dynamic signatures of
viruses and present a method to design viruses which are static signature-
free and whose dynamic signatures are hard to determine unless some
cryptographic assumption fails. This will answer a long time open ques-
tion in this area.
2 Notations
Turing machines are the basic model for computation. We will present
our construction in terms of Turing machines. Our notations are stan-
dard, e.g., as those in Hopcroft and Ullman [7]. We will use two-way
infinite tape, multi-track, and multi-tape Turing machines as our model
of computation. Formally, a Turing machine (TM) is denoted
M = (Q,Σ,Γ, δ, q0, B, F )
where Q is the finite set of states, Γ is the finite set of allowable tape
symbols, B is the blank symbol which belongs to Γ, Σ is the set of input
symbols which is a subset of Γ not including B, δ is the next move function
which is a mapping from Q × Γ to Q × Γ × {L,R} (δ may, however, be
undefined for some arguments), q0 ∈ Q is the start state, and F ⊆ Q is
the set of final states. For each TM M , there is a read only input tape
and a write only output tape.
Without loss of generality, we will assume that Σ = {0, 1} in this paper
unless specified otherwise. The set of strings over Σ will be denoted as
Σ∗, and the set of length n strings will be denoted as Σn. A subset of Σ∗
is called a set, a problem, or just a language. The characteristic function
of a set A is defined by letting A(x) = 1 if x ∈ A and A(x) = 0 otherwise.
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3 Generating undetectable signatures
From our analysis in previous sections, in order for a virus to be unde-
tectable, the virus must have some mechanism to check whether a program
has already been infected by it or not. For this purpose, most viruses will
put some flags in infected programs. These flags generally can be consid-
ered as signatures. Formally, the signature of a virus is a byte sequence
by which the virus can be distinguished from other programs or viruses.
That is, the virus code or programs infected by it contain this byte se-
quence, but all other programs or viruses generally do not contain this
byte sequence. This definition of virus signature is a static one (which
is generally used in the literature). In this paper, we will introduce a
new concept: a virus can have a dynamic signature. Formally, a dynamic
signature of a virus is a function which can be used to distinguish it from
other programs or viruses. From the definition, it is clear that dynamic
signatures of viruses can only be determined by simulating the execution
of the virus or the programs infected by it.
It is clear that each non-trivial virus should have either a static sig-
nature or a dynamic signature. Polymorphic viruses do not have static
signatures, but generally they have dynamic signatures. The reason why
all previous polymorphic viruses can be detected by current anti-virus
software in market is that their dynamic signatures are generally easy to
determine.
Obviously, viruses which have static signatures or whose dynamic sig-
natures are easy to determine can easily be detected. In order for a virus
to be undetectable, it should have the following properties:
• they have no static signatures in infected programs,
• their dynamic signatures are undetectable, for example, their dy-
namic signatures are hard to detect unless some cryptographic as-
sumption fails.
In this section, we present a method to design undetectable dynamic sig-
natures. In the next section, we will present a method for a virus to infect
programs so that it leaves no static signature and in the same time keeps
the dynamic signature undetectable.
Let F : N → N be a secure function with the following properties:
• |F (x)| = |x| for all x ∈ Σ∗,
• Given the values of F on some given set A ⊂ N , it is hard for the
enemy to compute any value of F on x /∈ A,
where N is the set of positive integers. Such kind of functions can be
chosen from any variant of digital signature schemes or some encryption
schemes, for example, a possible candidate is the encryption scheme of
Cramer and Shoup [4] which is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack. The reader is referred to [8] for more details on digital signature
schemes and encryption schemes..
A set D is called super sparse if |D ∩ Σn| ≤ 1 for all n and |D| =
∞. For each virus we will assign a super sparse set D as its dynamic
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signature. Note that only the virus creator knows the dynamic signature
of the virus. It should also be the case that it is computationally hard
to guess the dynamic signature of any virus. Let n0 > 100 be a large
enough integer and F be a secure function as mentioned above. Then the
dynamic signature for a virus is assigned as follows:
Dv = {x ∈ Σ
n : x is the binary representation of F (n), n > n0}
Our method to insert the dynamic signature into a virus is as follows:
the virus will modify the behavior of the host program such that the
program will output random values of 0 or 1 on inputs from Dv . Here we
assume that the host program is a Turing machineM which computes the
characteristic function of a set A (that is, A means the normal behavior
of the program). Then the infected program will be a Turing machine
M ′ with the properties that: M ′(x) = A(x) for all x /∈ Dv and M
′(x)
is a randomly chosen element from Σ (= {0, 1}) for x ∈ Dv. From the
property of randomness, M ′(x) = 1 for approximately one half inputs x
from Dv .
Note that if n0 is large enough, then the set Dv is a super sparse subset
of Σ∗, whence the terminal user will not notice the existence of the virus.
Also any anti-virus program will not be able to detect the virus unless
one of the following conditions holds:
1. the anti-virus program can search a space of at least 22n0 ;
2. the function F can be broken, that is, the anti-virus program can
compute the value F (n) for sufficiently many n > n0. (Indeed, in
practice, the anti-virus program even does not know the function
F ).
Let MDv be the Turing machine that models a virus with a dynamic
signature Dv . That is, MDv has the following properties:
• MDv computes the desired virus function (or behavior),
• MDv outputs randomly chosen elements from Σ for inputs from Dv .
4 Checking infected programs
Each time when a virus find a chance to infect a program, it will first
decide whether it has already infected the target program or not. For a
virus with a static signature, this will be straightforward. For a virus with
a dynamic signature (but without static signature), this can be done by
virtually simulating the execution of the target program on some inputs.
The following algorithm can be used for this purpose.
Checking algorithm:
1. Let c = 0, j = n0 + 1, and K0 be a specific reasonably large integer
(e.g., K0 = 100000);
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2. Let xj be the binary representation of F (j). We distinguish the
following two cases:
Case 1: M(xj) = 1. Let c = c+ 1 and j = j + 1.
Case 2: M(xj) = 0. Let j = j + 1.
3. If j < K0 then go to (2) else go to (4).
4. If c ≈ K0−n0
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then M has been infected. Otherwise, M is not in-
fected.
Note that the above checking algorithm sometime may output wrong
information. That is, sometime it will consider a non-infected program as
infected. However, this will not be a big problem for a virus. The purpose
of a virus is to infect many programs, and does not need to infect all
programs. Also it should be noted that if one can observe one execution
of the above checking algorithm, then one can easily determine an initial
part of the dynamic signature Dv, whence help the anti-virus software to
detect the virus. In order to solve this problem, we can use the protocol
of computation with encryption (see [1]).
Abadi and Feigenbaum [1] described a protocol how to securely evalu-
ate a Boolean circuit in encrypted data. They further reduced the problem
of evaluation of encrypted functions to the problem of processing of en-
crypted data by representing the Boolean circuit that is to be hidden as
data fed to a universal Boolean circuit. Sander and Tschudin ([11, 10])
have considered the similar problems in the context of protecting mobile
agents against malicious hosts. They have shown that it is possible for a
mobile agent to actively protect itself against its execution environment
that tries to get some information of the agent for some malicious goal.
Especially, they have identified a special class of functions – polynomials
and rational functions – together with encryption schemes that lead to
a non-trivial example of cryptographically hiding a function such that it
can nevertheless be executed with a non-interactive protocol. That is, mo-
bile agents executing this class of functions can protect themselves against
tampering by a malicious host and can conceal the programs they want to
have executed. Obviously our above checking algorithm can be considered
as a Boolean function of Abadi and Feigenbaum [1], though generally it
does not belong to the function classes identified by Sander and Tschudin
([11, 10]). In practice, a virus writer may find some trade-off between the
results of Abadi and Feigenbaum [1] and Sander and Tschudin [11, 10],
and achieve the following goal: it can check whether a program has already
been infected but not leak any information of its dynamic signature.
From the discussion of this section, we can model a virus with a dy-
namic signature Dv as a Turing machine MDv with the following proper-
ties:
• MDv computes the desired virus function (or behavior),
• MDv outputs randomly chosen elements from Σ for inputs from Dv .
• MDv can check whether a given program has already been infected
without leaking any information about its dynamic signature Dv.
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In the next section, we will give a method to embed this virus MDv into
any host program without leaving any static signature.
5 Inserting a virus into a program
Assume that we have a Turing machine M (that is, a program) which
computes the characteristic function of a set A. That is, for each x ∈ Σ∗,
M(x) = A(x). In order to infectM with a virusMDv , we will combine the
two Turing machines into one Turing machine and introduce randomness
into the codes so that no static signature is left in the combined Turing
machine.
For the reason of simplicity, we will assume that the virus Turing
machine MDv will only compute the following function
MDv (x) =
{
? x /∈ Dv
0 or 1 x ∈ Dv
Of course, a virus will do many other harmful things in practice. Our
results can be easily extended to these harmful viruses since we can regard
the host program Turing machineM and the harmful partMv of the virus
as one single Turing machine M and then apply our method (note that it
is trivial to combine two Turing machines into one single Turing machine).
Now the following problem remains to be addressed:
• For each virus Turing machine MDv and a host program Turing
machineM , how to construct a Turing machineM ′ which computes
the function
vcomb{A(x),MDv (x)} =
{
A(x) if MDv (x) =?
MDv (x) otherwise
such that fromM ′ it is computationally hard to get any information
of Dv? That is, how to construct M
′ such that the anti-virus soft-
ware cannot construct sufficient many elements of Dv? Note that
the anti-virus software may have no time to run theM ′s on all inputs
to get some information of the dynamic signature Dv .
One way vcomb-combination of Turing machines
A Turing machine M is called a vcomb-combination of TMs M1 and M2
if M(x) = vcomb{M1(x),M2(x)} for all x ∈ Σ
∗. A Turing machine M is
called a composition of TMs M1 andM2 if M(x) =M2(M1(x)) for all x ∈
Σ∗. It is widely believed that in practice it is hard to decompose a Turing
machine into two parts. For example, a cryptosystem system based on the
hardness of decomposition (and inverse) of finite automaton is suggested
in Tao and Chen [13]. However, if M is just a simple composition of two
TMs M1 and M2, then obviously one can construct M1 (and M2) from
M easily.
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In the following, we will present a method for constructing the vcomb-
combination M of two TMs M1 and M2 with the properties that it is
hard for the adversary to construct a TM M ′2 which is almost equivalent
to M2 in semantics, that is, M
′
2(x) = M2(x) for sufficiently many (the
exact number depends on applications) x ∈ Σ∗.
The procedure is as follows:
Input: TMsM1 andM2 which computeA(x) andMDv (x) respectively.
Without loss of generality, we may assume thatM1 = (Q1,Σ,Γ, δ1, q1,0, B, F )
and M2 = (Q2,Σ,Γ, δ2, q2,0, B, F ) satisfy the following properties.
1. |Q1| = |Q2| and |δ1| = |δ2|;
2. Both M1 and M2 are 3 tapes Turing machines. That is, Mi has one
read-only input tape, one working tape, and one write-only output
tape for i = 1, 2.
3. There is a number k > 0 such that both M1’s and M2’s working
tapes have k tracks1.
Now construct M as follows:
1. Construct a 7-tape Turing machineMa with the following properties:
• The first tape is the input tape;
• The second tape corresponds to the input tape of M1;
• The third tape corresponds to the k-track working tape of M1;
• The fourth tape corresponds to the output tape of M1;
• The fifth tape corresponds to the k-track working tape of M2;
• The sixth tape corresponds to the output tape of M2;
• The seventh tape is the output tape;
• On input x, Ma first copies x from the first tape to the second
tape, then parallely simulates the computations of M1(x) and
M2(x) (note that M2 uses the input from the second tape) on
the corresponding working tapes respectively. In the end, if the
content on the tape 6 is ?, then Ma copies the content on the
tape 4 to the tape 7, otherwise Ma copies the content on the
tape 6 to the tape 7. And Ma halts.
2. As in the proof of [7, Theorem 7.2, pp.161], convertMa into a 3-tape
Turing machine Mb with the following properties:
• The first tape is the input tape (the same as Ma’s input tape);
• The second tape has 2k+8 tracks, where the first two tracks are
for the second tape of Ma (one to record the tape contents and
one to record the second tape’s control head position), tracks 3
through k+3 are for the third tape ofMa (k tracks to record the
tape contents and one track to record the third tape’s control
1For any Turing machine M , it is easy to change it to a 3-tape (one input tape, one k-track
working tape, and one output tape) Turing machine.
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head position), tracks k + 4 through k + 5 are for the fourth
tape of Ma, tracks k+6 through 2k+6 are for the fifth tape of
Ma, and tracks 2k + 7 through 2k + 8 are for the sixth tape of
Ma.
• The third tape is the output tape (the same as Ma’s output
tape).
3. Choose a random permutation R : Σ2k+8 → Σ2k+8. Using the per-
mutation R to convertMb into a 3-tape Turing machineM with the
following properties:
• The second tape of M has only one track. That is, the second
tape of M is divided into k2k+8-size tuple-blocks. Each tuple-
block on the second tape of M corresponds to one block of the
Mb’s second tape.
• Each possible block on Mb’s second tape can be denoted by a
2k + 8-tuple of symbols from Σ. The next move function δMb
of Mb is converted to the next move function of δM in such a
way that each instantaneous description block x onMb’s second
tape (that is, a 2k + 8-tuple) is mapped to an instantaneous
description tuple-block R(x) of M .
Note that generally it is the case that the anti-virus software can get
a copy of M1 and M , and wants to find a description of M2. In order
for our construction to be robust against this situation, we can make
the following change to the vcomb-combination construction: First make
a random permutation of M1 (similar to what we have done for Mb in
the construction), then apply our above vcomb-combination construction.
Now it is clear that if one can recover the M2 from M , then one can
compute the permutation R.
Theorem 5.1 Let f be an algorithm to construct M2 from M , then f
can be used to compute the permutation R.
Proof. It is straightforward. ✷
Corollary 5.2 The probability that one can decompose M into M1 and
M2 equals to 2
2k+8!.
Theorem 5.3 There is an efficient process to construct from any two
given Turing machines M1 and M2 a vcomb-combination Turing machine
M with the following properties: given M and M1, with extremely high
probability, one cannot get any information of M2.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 5.1, Corollary 5.2, and our above
discussion. ✷
Signature undetectability
Due to the random permutation R in the vcomb-combination process, it
is straightforward that our virus will not have any static signature. The
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dynamic signature of our virus is also hard to detect. First, by Corollary
5.2 and Theorem 5.3, with extremely high probability the anti-virus soft-
ware cannot get a description of Turing machine MDv for the dynamic
signature. Whence, from a static analysis of the infected program, the
anti-virus software cannot get any information of the dynamic signature
of the virus. Secondly, when the anti-virus software simulates a virtual
execution of the virus (or the infected program), it can monitor the pro-
cess that the virus checks whether a program has already been infected
and the process that the virus inserts the hidden virus code into a pro-
gram. However, as mentioned in section 4, special techniques can be used
to avoid the leakage of the dynamic sugnature.
6 Conclusions
Even though our results show that a virus could be written in such a way
that its dynamic signature is hard to detect, each virus is still detectable.
For example, when we notice the existence of a virus, we can write a
simple program and let it be infected. Then we can modify this infected
program as the virus detector as follows: run this program in a protected
environment and activate its virus infection code. If this program decided
not to infect the target code, then with high probability that the taget code
is already infected by this virus. This implies that theoretically all known
viruses can be detected. However this method is infeasible in practice.
The main difficulty here is that there may be millions of different viruses.
If we include all of these viruses into the anti-virus software package, the
package will have a huge size, and the detecting process will be extremely
slow.
In this paper, we have used some results from mobile agents to improve
the quality of viruses. Indeed, there is a close relationship between viruses
and mobile agents. In some sense, network worms could be considered as
the prototype of mobile agents. Mobile agents have got extreme attention
recently. We are sure that any future breakthrough in mobile agents pro-
tection will also be a breakthrough for the design of undetectable viruses.
As have been noticed by computer virus research community, the best
way to protect computer and network systems against viruses is to use dig-
ital signatures. That is, each time when a computer application package
is developed, a digital signature of that software should also be available
to the users. This will also defeat the viruses we have designed in this
paper. However, this is difficult to achieve in practice. People like to
download some shareware (e.g., games) from Internet and run it. For this
kind of software, you have to trust the author. Even if you trust the share
ware author, it is practically difficult to include the signature keys of all
shareware writers in the virus scanner. Hence the virus may be written
in such a way that it will only infect this kind of shareware.
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